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The question of the relation between morality and 
religion which, during past periods of the history of 
Western philosophy, constituted the kernel of moral 
reasoning, has been systematically ignored by 
contemporary moral philosophers. The causes for this 
abandonment are many, some even quite obvious. It is, 
to say the least, unfashionable to concern oneself with 
religion while God is being killed, mourned, and 
buried. But, even worse, a contradiction of sorts 
seems to be involved in any attempt by atheists or 
agnostic philosophers to engage in speculations 
concerning God: And, indeed, such a contradiction 
would exist if any and all discussions relating to the 
concept of God did in fact presuppose the solution of 
the question of his existence. But, it so happens that 
the existence of God has no bearing whatever on the 
philosophical functions of the concept or notion of 
"God." In other words, a demonstration of the 
impossibility of the ontological proof does not, by 
itself, imply the absurdity and, much less, the 
uselessness of the notion of "God." Furthermore, it 
might well be the case that the necessity of the 
concept of "God" can be demonstrated independently from 
any proof of the existence of the being God. This I 
believe to be the case, and the purpose of this paper 
is to illusrtate this point in regard to ethics. The 
thesis that 1 am proposing is, then, that moral 
reasoning, insofar as it is aimed at providing an 
ultimate justification for moral action, requires the 
concept of "God." Or, to put it differently, the 
notion of obligation points to God. This thesis is 
developed in two parts. The first one is a critical 
analysis of some views on the role of the notion of 
"God" in morality, which I take to be particularly 
revealing. The analysis does not pretend to be 
comprehensive or exhaustive, and its purpose is rather 
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to spell out the genesis and the implications of the 
central issues to be discussed in the second part. 
This part consists of an outline of the series of 
arguments needed to clarify the role of the notion of 
"God" in morality. The purpose of this outline is 
primarily to point out the problems which need to be 
dealt with and to suggest the strategies which might 
help solve them. 
I 
Tlie Issues 
f would like to start this part of the paper with a 
warning: nothing of what will be said in the following 
pages implies that I consider all attempts to develop a 
naturalistic account of morality to be doomed. On the 
contrary, I think that human behavior as a whole, 
including moral behavior, can be explained in a 
comprehensive and satisfactory manner from a purely 
naturalistic or materialistic perspective. Social 
science will become a serious enterprise only to the 
extent that it manages to develop a materialistic 
explanatory framework. And in that respect the claims 
of thinkers from Marx to Marvin Harris seem to me to be 
reasonable. By far the majority of earthly events are 
earthly and the mysteries which envelop them when they 
first occur can be solved by digging holes in the 
earth, so to speak. 
But the ultimate and, hence, the most important 
task of ethics is not the explanation, but the 
justification of human behavior. No system of morals 
is complete unless it gives us guidelines for behavior, 
unless it exhibits the way to the good life. With the 
exception of a few modern skeptics this has been a 
conviction shared by philosophers of all times. 
Certainly, any attempt to provide a philosophical 
justification of behavior presupposes an understanding 
of its nature and conditions; but such an understanding 
does not provide all the material required to build a 
moral code and to recommend it in good faith to persons 
interested in doing the right things to go to heaven. 
Or, to put it differently, the understanding of the 
basis of human behavior might and, in fact, ought to 
make possible the construction of a moral code listing 
the conditions of possibililty.for human social life, 
for human life in general, namely a list of basic 
virtues. Although such a list of conditions or virtues 
is obviously a mediate precondition for the good life, 
it. is not self-evident that it is also an immediate or 
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sufficient condition for the good life not is it 
evident that the mere knowledge of this list will 
generate a willingness to be virtuous. Moral 
relativism results from the failure to understand this 
simple distinction. Relativism is the consequence of 
expecting more from the discovery of some of the causes 
of human social behavior than ought reasonably to be 
expected. What is ultimately required, then, is a 
means of jumping from the knowledge of the conditions 
of life in general, to the conviction that life is good 
or valuable or desirable and, even further, to the 
conviction that a certain style of life is superior to 
or more desirable than the innumerable other life 
styles made possible by these conditions. 
Intuitionists seem to me to be those among modern 
philosophers who have best recognized this problem. To 
solve it, they take the course that appears to be the 
most adequate and direct, namely, they assume that the 
desirability or goodness of the conditions of human 
life is inscribed, printed on them, that it is there to 
be seen by all those able and willing to do so. But the 
intuitionists can support their thesis only by making 
certain assumptions that imply the existence of a more 
complex human nature than the one that in fact exists. 
In other words, the intuitionists violate the 
prohibition to engage in the needless and arbitrary 
multiplication of the attributes of human nature. But 
this argument, in itself sufficient to discard 
intuitionism, is unnecessary, for if one examines the 
terms of the problem one will soon notice that 
intuitionism elegantly begs the question it is meant to 
answer. In fact, the question would not even arise if 
the problem were simply one of shortsightedness or 
blurred vision. Given that there is but one list of 
conditions of possibility for human life, what has to 
bo explained is the diversity of forms of life without 
having to make the arbitrary assumption that the 
"forces of evil" have managed to blind most humans, 
thus having systematically prevented them from seeing 
the right way to materialize these conditions. 
Intuitionism is, it seems to me, also motivated by 
the modern discomfort with the notion of God. For, in 
the end, postulating the existence of eternal, 
unchangeable truths, directly accessible to humans in a 
manner similar to those that give them access to the 
knowledge of nature, is a way of dispensing with Cod 
while retaining the notion of the "absolute" and, thus, 
leaving the door open for providing final 
justifications for moral action. But the strategy of 
the intuitionists is self-defeating for it ignores the 
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lessons taught by the Neo-Platonists and, especially, 
by Augustine. One of the greatest contributions of the 
Latin Father to theology was his clear realization of 
the connection between the Parmenidean-Platonists' 
notion of the absolute and the notion of God. The road 
that leads to one, leads eventually to the other. This 
insight was later developed in a rather revealing 
manner by several Medieval philosophers, and 
particularly by St. Anselm in whose theory it plays a 
crucial role. The eternity of truth is established by 
the same arguments that establish the eternity of God, 
which is why Anselm feels free to identify the two. 
This identification is the ground for the theory of 
rectitudo which allows the conclusion that moral truth 
and truth in general are one and the same thing. 
Rectitudo is the one criterion of truth in regard to 
logical, practical, sensory and all other types of 
human activity. So we cannot rely on a Parmenidean 
conception of the absolute and still pretend to avoid 
making ontological commitments regarding the existence 
of God. Paul Tillich has suggested this in a general 
manner in connection with his criticism of what he 
calls "value theory," which, as we know, is in most 
cases a form of intuitionism. Tillich argues: 
If there are such "absolute values" 
(absolute in the sense of being 
independent of a valuating subject), 
what is the source of their 
absoluteness, how can they be 
discovered, how are they related to 
reality, and what is their 
ontological standing? These 
questions lead unavoidably to a 
situation that the value theory by 
its very nature tries to avoid--
nameiy, a doctrine of being, an 
ontology. For values have reality 
only if they are rooted in reality. 
Their validity is an expression of 
their ontological formulation . . • 
And the ontological question regarding the absolute, I 
should hasten to add, always becomes theology. 
As far as 1 can see there are only two ways, 
historically speaking, that have been suggested to make 
the jump that the intuitionists fail to make. One is 
provided by Kant, the other by Aristotle and all those 
who hnve followed his path. The best way of 
characterizing the Aristotelian solution is perhaps by 
calling .it'the 'immanentist way." This, in general, is 
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the belief that the justification for mora) action can 
be derived from a definition of human nature. This 
belief has one immensely important consequence, to wit, 
that however we conceive the good, it cannot be 
something which lies beyond the qualities and 
capacities of human beings. So, for example, 
eudaimonia is something to be attained by the finite, 
living Individual according to Aristotle. The 
individual has only to rely on his capacities, innate 
and acquired or J earned, to reach the state of 
blessedness and joyful contemplation, for such a state 
is nothing but the full development and realization of 
the potentialities with which he is endowed by nature. 
But, as Kant has perceptively pointed out, even if v/e 
consider the state of contemplation to be a semi-divine 
state, the idea of happiness or eudaimonia in itself 
does not provide the sign or proof we 3esi re for the 
final meaningfulness of human existence. Kant's 
argument has three steps.5 The mere fact, he says, that 
there is someone to contemplate or to know the universe 
does not give it any worth, for it is not by becoming 
objects of experience that things acquire value. This 
is obvious for Kant due to the limitations he 
attributes to theoretical reason, the task of which is 
merely to present an object. Hence, if value were 
something to be known in this sense, it would have to 
be a sort of quality, which is not the case. But, on 
the other hand, it is not self-evident that 
contemplation itself has worth, and, certainly, if it 
had some, such worth would have to be determined in 
relation to a "final purpose" external to it. 
Moreover, and this is the second step, even if we admit 
that eudaimonia is possible, it does not follow from 
that simple fact either that a man "should" have a 
happy existence or that he should exist at all. We are 
forced to conclude, Kant says, that man himself is the 
"final purpose of creation," i.e., the source of worth 
of the universe. But, clearly, he cannot be such a 
source insofar as he is dependent upon the world, since 
if this were the case, the worth of the world v/ould 
depend upon itself and not upon man. Thus, man can be 
thought of as the final end of creation only insofar as 
he can give something to himself spontaneously and, in 
this way, to the world, which is not determined by the 
world. In other words, man can be the final goal of 
the universe only to the extent that he is free, a 
moral being. 
At this point v/e do not need to get as far as the 
proof for the existence of God. But, Kant's arguments 
or something like them are probably enough to expose 
the inherent insufficiency of Aristotelian immanentism. 
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It is not at all surprising that, as has been pointed 
out repeatedly, Aristotle did not develop the notion of 
"obligation." The reason is not only that this notion 
implies the idea of "external compulsion" which clashes 
with his definition of voluntary action.^ The deeper 
reason, it would seem, is that the notion oT 
obligation, when pushed far and hard enough, becomes 
indistinguishable from that oT final justification, and 
there is, as Kant points out, no basis in Aristotelian 
ethics to support this last idea. Happiness is said to 
be the "supreme good" because we choose it for its own 
sake. But in a chain of justification it will appear 
not as an absolute, but simply as a reasonable and 
desirable ending point. That is, granted that we seek 
happiness, it does not follow that we "ought" to desire 
each of the actions that lead to it. All that follows 
is that, insofar as we are reasonable persons and 
honest in our desire for happiness, we would be better 
off desiring the means to achieve a certain goal that 
we might have in mind. Desiring happiness, then, helps 
us determine the practical necessity of certain 
actions, not their moral necessity. 
Such Christian philosophers as Augustine and 
Aquinas were able, partially at least, to make tip for 
the deficiencies of the Aristotelian position, while 
preserving its immanentism basically intact. This they 
did with the help of the notion of "God." Happiness is 
defined as the realization of all the potentialities 
with which human nature is endowed. This realization 
is to be accomplished through the means and capacities 
available to humans gua humans. The difference from 
the Aristotelian conception is that some of these 
capacities are thought to have a non-natural or, 
better, a supra-natural dimension. Insofar as they are 
supra-natural they are also supra-temporal. This means 
that their fulfillment cannot and does not have to be 
realized during the natural existence of humans. It is 
realized during their supra-natural existence. But 
given that the real fulfillment will come only later, 
all the actions undertaken during the period of natural 
existence will have to be seen as secondary in relation 
to the final goal of supra-natural fulfillment. But, 
of course, in regard to this Tinal fulfillment, as in 
regard to the mundane happiness of the Aristotelian 
view, one can always ask the question, why should anyone 
desire it? In the case of Aristotle there was no 
answer to this question, no possible answer in terms of 
what ought to be done. The supra-natural character of 
the fulfillment envisioned by the Christian thinkers 
opens the door for a possible, plausible answer, for we 
can say that the supra-natural fulfillment not only is 
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desired, buL that it ought: to be desired. And we ought 
to desire it because we are not masters of our being, 
but depend on the one who conceived mid gave us that 
being, who, in turn, is the only one who can guarantee 
our final fulfillment. In other words, we ought to 
desire the fulfillment of our being, because we owe it 
to someone who demands careful and punct.ua.I payment. 
The notion of "God," then, permits the introduction of 
the idea of "demand" or "debt" for which there is no 
place in Aristotelian ethics, and which underlies the 
concept oT "obligation." 
But this course of reasoning does not fully 
compensate for all the shortcomings of the Aristotelian 
conception, since together with the notion of 
"obligation" we inevitably get the one of "compulsion." 
The Christian strategy to dissolve the paradox of 
claiming that we have an obligation to desire the 
supreme good has always been to stress the loving 
nature of God. God is like a loving father, and the 
obligations he imposes stem from his infinite love and 
wisdom. In fact, they appear as a burden only to those 
who have chosen to go in the wrong direction and, 
hence, to forfeit their only chance to reach happiness 
or blessedness. God's demands appear as compulsory 
only to those who have alienated themselves from him. 
One finds here one of the reasons why the notion of. 
AA!'®I"HH! Arbitrium is so crucial to Christian thought. 
If love and not"sheer compulsion, in the form of either 
fear or utilitarian considerations, is to motivate 
humans, then they must be free beings, for love is not 
truly so unless it is spontaneous and contingent. The 
notion of necessary or obligatory love is a 
contradiction in terms. This is why, for the 
Christians, freedom, in its most basic sense, is the 
capacity to be spontaneous, to act voluntarily. 
for Kant, too, as we have seen, freedom plays a 
crucial role in facilitating the transition to the idea 
of a "final purpose" of moral action. The notions of 
"obligation" and "God" are also essential to his 
system. But Kant goes beyond the traditional Christian 
thinkers in one respect, namely, he avoids making an 
ontological commitment in relation to the existence of 
God. His "proof" of the existence of God is based on 
the "subjective" demands of reason, and, therefore, all 
it proves is that the existence of God is a necessary 
assumption. This assumption is not: even necessary to 
support the validity of the moral law, which would lose 
none of its absolute imperative force even if God did 
not exist, that is, even if we refused to assume that 
he exists. Without: God goodness would, in the end. 
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make no difference, but it would still be mandatory 
according to the moral law.5 
Kant is led into this path by a variety of 
considerations, most of which are well-known and depend 
directly on his analysis of theoretical reason. But 
the only reason really relevant to our discussion is a 
kind of corollary to his analysis, to wit, the 
necessary rejection of the theory of rectitudo. In the 
framework of Kant's system, moral rightness cannot be 
identified with empirical truth, nor with theoretical 
truth. The rejection of the theory of rectitudo closes 
the door for any argument of the Augustini an type 
concerning the relationship between moral obligation 
and Cod. 
But it is not only his examination of theoretical 
reason which induces Kant to rely on a purely moral 
proof of the existence of Cod. He is pushed in this 
same direction by his study of physical or natural 
teleology. The consistent development of physical 
teleology, Kant says, "could only found a Demonology;"6 
that is, it could at most generate the idea of an 
"infel 1igent-world-canse," which is all that is needed 
to satisfy the requirements of the "theoretical 
reflective judgment." But the idea of an intelligent 
world-cause is miles away from the idea of a Deity, 
which is what is needed to introduce finality into the 
universe and satisfy the demands of practical reason. 
Here Kant has arrived in his own peculiar way at the 
same conclusion forcefully expressed before him by Duns 
Scotus in his criticism of Aristotle and, indirectly, 
of Aquinas. The notion of God's perfection is not 
exhausted, the Doctor Subtil is argues, by that of an 
unmoved motor capable of an infinitely durable motion; 
that is, one cannot derive the perfection of God from 
the infinitude of motion alone, for the notion of 
"Divine Perfection" includes more than the simple 
notion of physical perfection. God is more than a 
perfect artifact.7 Etienne Gilson has explained Duns 
Scotus' argument by saying that what it proves is that 
arguments based on experience can never lead us beyond 
the natural, realm to the supra-natural realm which is 
the dwelling place of the Divinity. for Duns Scotus 
the v/ay to the Deity is an a posteriori but rational 
proof; for Kant, on the other hand, the argument must 
be moral. 
Although with this move Kant in some sense escapes 
some of the problems that bothered the Medievals, he by 
no means can be said to have escaped all of them. The 
"paradox of obligation" remains with him in an 
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augmented and more treacherous Tonn. Let us examine 
this briefly. Although God gives some sense or purpose 
to our moral action, the categorical character of the 
moral law is not grounded on God's will, for, as we 
saw, according to Kant the moral law appears as an 
absolute imperative even to the skeptic. Rut iT God's 
will is not behind the mora) law, neither is hin love, 
and, hence, we are left with the idea of duty or 
obligation in its purest form, i.e. unmitigated by 
love. Love has a certain role to play in Kant's 
system, but only after having been totally deprived of 
its "emotional" content, only after having become a dry 
love, so to speak, and therefore incapable of operating 
as a mitigating force upon obligation. To love God, 
Kant says, is simply "to love to do His commandments. "8 
"True," someone is likely to say at this point, "but 
you are forgetting the notion of freedom, for it in 
after all freedom which grounds the moral lav/." Here 
we have come to the most difficult problem of Kant's 
ethical system, the conciliation of the notions of 
freedom and obligation. Obviously, this is not the 
place to embark on a detailed discussion of this issue, 
and such an enterprise is unnecessary for the limited 
purpose of this paper. The only general question we 
need to answer is whether freedom and obligation as 
presented in Kant's system relate to each other in a 
way which avoids producing the paradox that Aristotle 
solved by banning the latter notion from his ethical 
system. 
To the question, why should I comply with the Moral 
Law, Kant answers, "because you are a rational being, 
and rationality implies universal lawfulness." Rut 
does this mean, we might then ask, that we are 
determined by "nature" to be rational, to act according 
to law? If by "nature" we mean physical causality, 
Kant would respond, then the answer is no, and in thin 
sense we are free in a negative sense; but, if by 
"nature" we mean simply that we have a capacity to be 
rational, i.e. to order out: behavior by means of our 
will in such a way that it corresponds to law, then the 
answer is yes, and we are free in a positive nenne. 
The problem with this in that even if v/e grant that 
Kant is right so far, we are left up in the air, for 
this response in not enough to show that we have an 
"obligation" to follow the moral law. All if shows in 
that v/e should "desire" to follow it, but mere "desire" 
even when it is desire of the moral law, is not 
"obligation," and nothing is changed here if instead of 
the word "desire" we use the word "will." Another way 
of putting this name problem in to ask, why should I do 
my duty, or why should I desire to do my duty, or even 
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more clearly, why should I desire to exercise my 
"positive" freedom; why should 1 not allow myself to be 
overwhelmed by desire? The answer made possible by the 
moral proof of the existence of God is not fully 
satisfactory, since at most it results in an admonition 
to act taking into account a reasonable supposition. 
Such an admonition is no more effective than Pascal's 
wager, and, perhaps, it is less so because Kant's God 
is handicapped, for this god does not back his demands 
and promises with the big stick of the traditional God; 
he does not threaten anyone with eternal damnation. 
God, insofar as he is simply a sense-giver, but not a 
law-giver, cannot be thought of as the source of 
obligation. But then we are left with a new paradox, 
for it appears that the obligation inherent in the idea 
of the categorical imperative is itself contingent in 
some sense, namely, contingent upon our desire to 
exercise our pure will. In other words, even if we 
grant that Kant has proved that humans have the ability 
to act as causes upon some world and modify it so that 
it corresponds to the commands generated by their 
legislating will, we do not have to grant also that 
they have an "obligation" to attempt to modify the 
world in that manner. Proving that man has a certain 
capacity or faculty does not presuppose or imply a 
proof of the necessity to exercise that capacity. It 
is only with reference to God that "having" and "doing" 
can be said to be identical; in the case of human 
beings such an identification is impossible, since the 
person is not all powerful and hence can at most aspire 
to be a Demiurge.; one can attempt to order and reorder 
things, not to create them ex nihilo in a particular 
order. This Kant knows, for otherwise he would not 
feel the urge to introduce the idea of God into his 
ethical system. 
If seems, then, that without the idea of a supreme-
law-giver it is not possible to conciliate the notions 
of "freedom" and "obligation." If all we have to rely 
on are people's capacities and incapacities, a gulf 
will always exist between these two notions. Kant had 
to pay a certain price for living in somewhat skeptical 
times. lie had to pretend to ignore the fact that the 
notion of "law" was first introduced into metaphysics 
in conjunction with that of an all-powerful creator. 
Before, law had alv/ays been perceived under the modes 
of contingency and practical necessity. This can be 
seen clearly in Aristotle's treatment of the notion. 
Lav; is not desired for its own sake, for truly virtuous 
people are above the law, which is merely an efficient 
mechanism of compulsion. It is necessary only because 
there are beast-like humans who respond only to threats 
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and force; it is external, alien to humanity, and if 
partakes in reason only accidentally. In fact, by 
itself, it can produce only an appearance of happiness, 
since happiness, as Kant himself remarks,!* cannot be 
the subject of command. But Cod, insofar as he is a 
loving-father, can make absolute laws and stipulate the 
pursuit of happiness as an obligation. The difficulty 
arises when, like Kant, vre want to think of Cod as a 
mere postulate while insisting on the absolute autonomy 
of human reason, for then v/e can have neither absolute 
commands in the strict sense of the word, nor a command 
to make ourselves happy. 
The problem is immensely complicated by the fact 
that God is the only being which can be conceived as 
beyond the conflict between reason and passion. God 
alone is infinitely resonable and infinitely 
passionate, for in him the different attributes of 
being cannot collide. This is why he can be both a 
legislator and a loving father at the same time. But 
in humans passion and reason oppose each other, so that 
they cannot be both passionate and law-givers. A 
serious legislative activity must therefore be 
passionless, unemotional. Man can play God only at the 
expense of crippling himself. This has rightly and 
consistently been perceived as the greatest weakness of 
Kantian ethics, although, as far as 1 have been able to 
see, very few philosophers have made serious proposals 
to compensate for this weakness. This is partly due to 
the, strictly speaking, Godless character of most of 
the original systems of modern ethics. Some of these 
systems do not even include the notion of "obligation," 
as, for instance, in the case of most naturalist 
schools, particularly utilitarianism. Other schools, 
such as existentialism, for example, have sought to 
escape the problem by watering down Kant's ideas to the 
point that they become meaningless and devoid of 
explanatory power. They confuse freedom with caprice 
and distort the notion of duty to make it reappear as a 
weak and purely subjective sense of commitment that 
individuals are supposed to feel in regard to their 
fellow humans. Such theories are not very enlightening 
and serve less to solve the problem than to illustrate 
difficulties. On the other hand, we have already 
mentioned some of the limitations of moral 
intuitionism, which is the other important modern 
attempt to deal with the issues being examined here. 
Curiously enough, however, what seems to mc to be 
the most serious (albeit somewhat incomplete) effort to 
advance beyond Kant in the study of morality and its 
relation to the notion of God comes from a religious 
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man, Tillich. In his brief lectures on ethics (cf. 
p. above), Till ich seeks to produce a synthesis of 
Christian and Kantian ideas which, while preserving the 
notions of "law" and "obligation," is able to 
accomodate those of "God" and "love" and to make 
concessions to the circumstantial or contingent 
character of man's earthly existence. Let us briefly 
examine these ideas. 
Tillich's starting point is the Aristotelian claim 
that the good for man is the full development of his 
potentialities. The central problem of moral 
philosophy becomes again that of jumping from this 
assertion to the imperative that man ought to develop 
his potentialities. To assist him in accomplishing 
this feat, Till ich calls on the notion of God. But the 
God he summons is not a law-giver in the traditional 
sense, for God, being at the same time creator and law-
giver, has inscribed his law in the essence of his 
creatures. Thus, the obedience demanded from these 
creatures is not mere submission; it does not imply 
external compulsion, but it is nonetheless totally 
unconditional. Note, however, that the unconditional 
character of the moral demands does not stem 
exclusively from the fact that they reflect our 
essence; the principal fact to be considered here is 
the God-given goodness of this essence. It is then not 
because it is ours that we have an unconditional 
obligation to heed the demands of our essence, but 
because it is a "good" essence. Goodness itself and 
not our contingent essence, is the origin of the 
unconditional moral imperative. 
But what doer, our essence demand? Simply, Till ich 
says, it demands that we develop ourselves as persons 
and that we treat persons as ends in themselves, that 
we treat persons as persons. This basic demand we call 
"justice." Because of the kinds of things persons are, 
because of the fact that they are, to use Buber's 
expression, not mere "its," our perception of persons 
as persons cannot be merely this, but has to lead to a 
certain attachment or involvement; it has to be 
accompanied by love in all its multifaceted forms. 
Here we need not to go into lengthy discussions of 
Tillich's notion of love, although this would certainly 
be a most interesting task given that, to my knowledge, 
no other thinker has treated the issue with comparable 
depth and seriousness. Let us simply point out what 
love, an the concrete content of the moral imperative, 
adds to it, and what are, in Tillich's view, the main 
advantages of these additions. 
59 
Justice, as regards the human condition, must be 
both univers! and flexible. Now law, in the sense of 
human law, can be universal only at the expense of 
being purely formal, that is,'general enough to ignore 
the particularity of each situation. On the other 
hand, law can be flexible only by limiting its scope of 
applicability or, in other words, by renouncing its 
claim of universality and making itself relative to a 
set of particular circumstances. Justice, then, if 
identified with human law, becomes either void 
formalism, as is the case in Kant's philosophy, or 
relativism. 
But the main limitation of human law. Til I ich 
thinks, is its essential inability to reach the degree 
of flexibility needed to "accept the unacceptable;" law 
does not have the power of forgiveness, for such a 
power "must come from something above the Jaw." in 
this respect Tillich's views on lav; are closer to those 
of Aristotle than to those of Kant. Human law, in his 
opinion, is necessary when human beings exercise their 
freedom to alienate themselves from their essence, to 
act against their own essence. When this happens law 
itself is impotent to redeem, for it cannot "accept the 
unacceptable," namely the very same thing it is 
supposed to prevent. Only love has the power and the 
flexibility to rede em. 
But, one might ask, how do humans recognize the law 
of God dwelling in their essence? Til Itch answers this 
question with the help of what he calls the Pauline 
notion of "conscience." Conscience is not the source 
of morality, but is capable of "witnessing" the law. 
It is through "conscience" that humans gain an 
understanding of divine law. 
There is, however, another important advantage of 
love over human law. The latter. Til I ich argues, 
cannot adapt to historical change without being 
annihilated, for insofar as human law is relative to a 
set of conditions, wherever those conditions change 
radically, what will be needed is not a mere 
modification of the old law, but new laws. In 
Tillich's words, law cannot respond to "Kairos." This 
term is central in Tillich's thought, and what it 
denotes is, basically, the appearanr-e or the coming to 
be of a new historical moment, such as the one 
initiated by the coming of the Christ. Love, on the 
other hand, remaining substantially unchanged, can 
modify its appearance to match the demands of" "Kairos." 
Tillich's explication of this process of adaptation 
seems to me to be one of the weakest elements in his 
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moral theory; but, at any rate, in its concrete form, 
the historical transformations of the appearance of 
love result in an extension of justice in the world, 
that is, more and more people are regarded and treated 
as persons. 
Even this sketchy and imperfect presentation of 
Tillich's moral theory should be sufficient to help us 
see some of its obvious advantages over Kantian 
formalism. But there is one important respect in which 
it falls short of solving the problems that Kant's 
theory was designed to address. For, after all. 
Till ich did not live in a historical period any less 
skeptical than Kant's. We are no more in a position 
simply to affirm or assume the existence of God than 
Kant was, but it is precisely this assumption which 
underlies Tillich's views. 1 realize, of course, that 
these views constitute a part of a much broader 
theological system, but the problem is, precisely, that 
much of their correctness depends on the correctness of 
certain theological speculations. Nevertheless, it is 
clear that, granted the assumption of the existence of 
a God interested in human affairs, Tillich's theories 
provide a better picture of the nature and the 
mechanisms of this interest than do Kant's theories. 
This does not mean, however, that the picture is 
faultless. Let me try to point out some of the dark 
spots 1 perceive. 
For all its merits, Tillich's moral views remain 
firmly grounded on the presuppositions of bourgeois 
individualism. I will not attempt to discuss here the 
very interesting suggestion of the Peruvian 
philosopher, Antonio Pena, who claims that Christian 
thought is essentially individualistic and that, thus, 
it finds its most accomplished expression not in 
scholastic but in early modern philosophy. The thesis 
seems to me to be quite plausible and, further, 
consistent with Til lieh'« claim concerning some of the 
theological viev/s of the reformers, which he regards as 
important rediscoveries of the initial and true 
Christian spirit. My claim here is rather that 
bourgeois individualism is a major obstacle for the 
perception of the true nature of persons and of the 
relationship between persons. 
Now, Til lieh in aware of the fact that justice must-
be realized in a social setting and, hence, that 
whoever attempts to fulfill the moral law and develop 
himself as a person, must at the same time attempt to 
promote the personhood of his fellow men. What bothers 
me is not this, but the way Tillich pictures the 
61 
relationship between individuals. Individuals, tie 
says, are each a "self" and "every self is self-related 
and a complete self is completely self-related." The 
individual is an independent "center," indivisible and 
impenetrable. and therefore is rightly called an 
individual."'^ Love is the force that brings these 
separated centers together, and it. can do so because 
they are not completely strange or alien to each other, 
but simply "estranged" from each other, there being a 
certain fundamental unity among them. But a fulfilled 
love relationship does not imply the annihilation of 
the separate selves: 
It is the superiority of the person-
to-person relationship that it 
preserves the separation of the 
self-centered self, and nevertheless 
actualizes their reunion in love. 
The highest form of love and that 
form of it which distinguishes 
Eastern and Western cultures is the 
love which preserves the individual 
who is both the subject and the 
object of love. In the loving 
person-to-person relationship 
Christianity manifests its 
superiority to any other religious 
tradi tion.'' 
The fundamental ontological unity of all seif-
ccntered selves is in God, who is the basis of all 
being or being-itself. To the question, why did God go 
to the trouble of disrupting this fundamental unify, 
thus making love necessary, Tillich answers with a 
variation of the old August:.!nian argument to explain 
the existence of evil and imperfect:ion in creation: 
"The power oT God," he says, "is that He overcomes 
estrangement, not that He prevents it; that He takes 
it, symbolically speaking, lipon himself, not that He 
remains in a dead identity with Himself."12 
Estrangement is the basis for the "dynamics of 
life," hence, the image of a world in which all 
estrangement has been overcome cannot be confused with 
that of the Kingdom of God; the Kingdom of God, in 
other words, is, strictly speaking, not of this 
world.13 This conclusion, it seems to me, reveals the 
real nature of Tillich's moral theory, which is 
grounded on the bourgeois assumption that conflict and 
tension constitute the juice of existence, the 
"dynamics of life." This conception gives us an 
inverted picture of reality, for it represents the 
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relations between persons not as fundamentally 
cooperative, but as prima facie antagonistic. This is 
precisely why Till ich is forced to attribute a divine 
quality to love, for purely human love would have to be 
contingent, since, by themselves, two strange 
individuals cannot generate a necessary urge to unite. 
But the role of God, then, appears diminished, almost 
like the role of God in the tragedies of Euripides, a 
God which emerges from the wings to impose necessity on 
a world condemned to contingency. 
it is only by conceiving the generation of persons 
as a process resulting from the necessary cooperative 
intercourse between human beings, that the notion of 
moral obligation can be introduced without arbitrary or 
seemingly arbitrary references to the Divinity. God, 
then, should not be introduced to demonstäte that 
humans have an obligation to relate to each other and 
to treat each other as persons. A purely naturalistic 
account of morality should be able to provide a more 
than satisfactory demonstration of this fact. God is 
necessary, if at all, as Kant clearly saw, to introduce 
the notion of absolute necessity. I should not need to 
think of God to know how 1 ought to relate to my fellow 
humans; "God," or any similar notion, is required only 
to convince me that I should desire without 
reservations to fulfill my obligations toward myself 
and toward other persons. Or to put it differently, a 
purely naturalistic account of morality is successful 
if it shows that the mere self-awareness of a person as 
a person suffices to indicate to him his duties toward 
other persons. But, what no naturalistic account can 
do is prove that one ought to desire to exist as a 
person, that one ought not be tempted to commit 
suicide. Tillich's theory, although illuminating in 
many respects, is deficient in that it relies on the 
notion of "(Jod" to generate both the idea of moral 
obligation and that of absolute moral obligation. So, 
although the strategy followed by Tillich to explain 
the relationship between the notion of "God" and 
morality is superior to that used by Kant, the latter 
must be acknowledged to have recognized the problems 
involved in the solution more clearly. 
In a brief booklet dealing with the problems facing 
contemporary theologians, Peter Borger has made a point 
similar in some ways to the one I am attempting to 
express here.H He claims that any serious theological 
speculations undertaken now a days must start with 
people; in other words, that it must face what we could 
call the Feuerbachian challenge and show that every 
v/e 11-developed science of humanity, a serious 
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anthi.opoJ.ogy points at the Supernatural . The 
understanding of human nature, Berger believes, can 
constitute the basis Tor general arguments to show the 
plausibility of postulating the existence of a 
supernatural realm of being, of which humans ate 
constantly aware. Whether one agrees with his 
particular claims and arguments, one has to admit, it 
seems to me, that Berger's most general claim, namely, 
that all theology must be grounded in an anthropology, 
is correct. Tillich, like Heidegger in his later 
years, wanted to start from the opposite end, from a 
general, ontology. But to do so is to deny the 
elementary Aristotelian rule which is the inevitable 
rule of inquiry in our time, that what is first in the 
order of being is not necessarily first in the order of 
inquiry. Modern philosophy has raised too many 
extremely serious epistemoJogicai doubts that cannot be 
simply dismissed. The reconstruction of ontology 
cannot be undertaken by simply ignoring the many valid 
questions raised in the last few centuries concerning 
the limitations of human understanding and the 
mechanisms of knowledge. Above all, we cannot simply 
resurrect God without giving extraordinarily good 
reasons to do so, and, like Kant, I believe that the 
first of those reasons ought to be provided by a 
science of morals. 
Part 11. The Arguments 
So, having briefly and incompletely insinuated some 
of the problems involved in the explication of the 
relationship between morality and the idea of "God," 
let me now insinuate, in a manner not less brief and 
incomplete, what I take to be the solution to some of 
those problems. 
What is it, then, that needs to be shown? first, 
it is indispensable to prove that there are limitations 
intrinsic to any purely naturalistic attempt to provide 
an ultimate justification for human moral action. 
Secondly, it has to be shown thai: such a justification 
must be thought to be supra-natural in character. The 
second task involves numerous assumptions about the 
nature of the supernatural, the most important of which 
are: a) that granted that there is a super-natural 
realm of being, such a realm is related to the natural 
realm so as to serve as its final cause, and b) that 
this causal connection can be known by humans. bet ns 
examine these presuppositions and attempt to determine 
whether we would be justified in making them. 
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*This" classification does not pretend to be final, it 
is rather propedeutic in nature. An attempt to fit all 
real views into this framework would have to take into 
account some other elements and an infinitude of 
details and nuances. 1 do think, however, that the 
three groups of theories considered here are the most 
basic and the most general. 
In general, there are three ways of explaining 
naturalistic-ally the motivations for human behavior.* 
One can claim either that the predominent motives are 
physiological, psychological or sociological in 
character. By physiological motives is meant those 
connected with the needs and demands of the body, 
namely those that the ancients used to call appetites 
and emotions. Psychological, in this context, are 
those motives for behavior stemming from the reflective 
activity of the soul, and here it is irrelevant whether 
we think that the soul is identical with the brain or 
totally different from it. The only thing that counts 
to characterize a motive as psychological is that it be 
generated when the soul reflects upon its own needs or 
those of the body it serves or, if you will, controls. 
Sociological motives are those that stem from the 
demands of the human or cultural environment in which 
the single individual lives. 
If we suppose that the only acceptable sort of 
explanations of human action are physiological, then the 
very notion of "justification" will have to be 
abandoned. And this will be so even if we leave room 
for teleological explanation, for in this latter case, 
the highest notion we can generate is that of an 
"organism." The only representation of God compatible 
with the conception of nature as a whole, including 
human beings, as an organism is that of a Demiurge or, 
even better, that of the gods who, according to 
Protagoras' story in the Platonic dialogue, attempt to 
establish a closed, balanced ecological system. What 
is missing in such a picture of the world is the notion 
of a free agent. The functioning of an individual 
organ does not need to be "justified;" the exhibition 
of its internal mechanisms and of its role in the net 
of interorganic relations exhaust all that can be said 
about it. This is why, even when an organism has been 
thoroughly understood, the question about its purpose 
is always possible. To answer that question it is 
obviously not enough to rely on new teleological 
explanations of the 
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type which permitted the understanding of the working 
mechanisms of the organism. Such strategy can lead, at 
best, to an infinite regress, and, at worst, to a 
circular argument, for to the question, why should 
organ x do y, we can answer only by pointing out that 
doing y is x's business in the organism. 
In this respect, psycbologism, which introduces the 
notion of "soul" or "mind" and, hence, that of 
"freedom," is infinitely superior to physio Iogism. The 
whole Kantian proof, which we have briefly mentioned 
above, hinges on the conviction that this is the case. 
Kant's conception of God, on the other hand, 
constitutes the best illustration of the inherent 
limitations of psychologism to understand the 
transcendental or supernatural dimension of morality. 
Psychologism can provide ns with the idea of a free 
agent, an agent capable of voluntary action, that is, 
capable of placing himself beyond natural causality, be 
it physiological or mechanical. But this mere faculty 
of freedom does not provide the justification for its 
own exercise, unless one thinks, a la Nietzsche, that, 
the will justifies itself through its own exercise. 
But, as is well known, the Nietzschean thesis 
presupposes the death of. God, that is, the 
impossibility of thinking of an ultimate and unique 
justification. If, on the other hand, the agents of 
freedom are numerous, then it follows necessarily that 
there cannot be a unique justification, save by 
accident; namely, if it happens to be the case that 
there exists only one free agent in the universe. But, 
even if this were the case, the task of proving that 
the actions of such a unique agent contain their own 
final justification would remain unsolved until it were 
shown that, by necessity, the agent could not be 
thought to act whimsically or arbitrarily. 
It was, it seems to me, to escape this paradox that 
Kant equated the exercise of freedom with the voluntary 
submission to a universal law. The universal law 
provides a natural meeting point for all the individual 
wills, it helps them transcend themselves, overcome 
their narrowness and, most importantly, endows each of 
them with the appearance of necessity. Rut given that 
the universal law is a mere formula it. cannot be oT any 
help in the task of discriminating between the relevant 
and the irrelevant motives of action of the individual, 
wills. Any wish can become morally relevant provided 
only that it be incorporated into the magic formula and 
thus endowed with the appearance of necessity. The 
most trivial or absurd wishes can in that manner be 
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transformed into duties or unqualified obligations. 
From the perspective of moral law, then, all cats are 
grey, for the feats of the hero are not any more moral 
than the activities of the mediocre. The lifestyle of 
the petit-bourgeois, who consumes his life worrying 
about inconsequential matters, is thus vindicated, and 
triviality is endowed with a transcendental meaning. 
Kant's God is, in this respect, the God of the honest 
Hausfrau. 
Here, again, the problem is that an individualistic 
conception of man has been adopted as the starting 
point. Later we will see that it is reasonable to 
assume that God is in a general way concerned with the 
fate of the individual person. What is not reasonable 
is to pretend that God's major concerns coincide with 
those that individuals might have qua individuals. The 
ultimate meaning of moral action cannot reside in the 
private domain of individuals, since, as we have seen, 
this clashes with the very idea of an ultimate meaning 
of moral action. But, on the other hand, if that which 
transcends individuality and constitutes what is 
universally common to humans is to be thought 
meaningful, it cannot be thought simultaneously to be 
devoid of all substantial content. Sociologism can be 
defined, in general, as the doctrine which claims that 
the social bonds between individuals constitute the 
substance that justifies or gives meaning to human 
action. Marxism, in its vulgar version, is probably 
the best contemporary example of sociologism. 
So, the forces that join a man with other men to 
constitute society provide, at the same time, the 
ultimate justification for the actions of each 
individual and of society as a whole. In a way, we 
have already dismissed this doctrine when, at the 
beginning, we claimed that the mere explanation of the 
caimes and mechanisms of human behavior does not, by 
and in itself, provide an ultimate justification for 
thai: behavior. Let us now give more detailed arguments 
to support this view. 
Imagine a society that sets as its goal and, 
therefore, as the implicit goal of the individuals that 
constitute it, the construction of certain 
architectonic marvels, which will bring, when 
completed, not only a great sense of accomplishment and 
collective fulfillment, but also considerable well-
being to all citizens. Assume further that the 
construction of these marvels requires the sacrifice of 
several generations of men, among whom there is an 
incurable skeptic who never ceases to ask the question: 
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"why should I sacri fice myself for the sake of some 
future generation since, after all, all. I am going to 
experience during my lifetime is deprivation and 
suffering?" The answer to this question can only be, 
"you should sacrifice yourself for the sake of the 
fatherland or for the sake of your children, etc." In 
other words, the answer is the same, exactly the same, 
that the skeptic would get if he were to ask why he 
should be a good citizen, respect the lav/, and love his 
family. What is not the same is his situation, for in 
this latter case, and provided that his society is not 
an utterly miserable and unjust one, his being a "good" 
citizen and parent will be translated into observable 
or, at least, immediately foreseeable results, while in 
the former case this is ruled out by the initial 
assumption. 
Unless we choose to persuade him with the help of a 
whip, we should have to find better reasons to convince 
a person that the immediate sacrifice of his happiness 
for the sake of the uncertain future happiness of 
remote generations is reasonable and, more importantly, 
that doing so is his absolute moral obligation. (To 
facilitate the argument we can even assume that there 
is only one society in the world, since, otherwise, to 
the challenge just mentioned we would have to add that 
of proving that each man is, by nature, hound to the 
society into which he has been born in a way that would 
make it immoral for him to switch allegiances.) In 
other words, a society can never provide its citizens 
with more than what it has to offer during their 
lifetimes. This apparently trivial fact, or, better, 
the attempt to ignore it, has had an enormous 
importance. All messianisms of the sociological type 
owe their effectiveness to their ability to get people 
to forget this fact, namely the fact that only living 
persons are effective members of society and that, 
therefore, society can give them only practical 
compensation for their efforts. 
This is why, in the long run, only the exercise of 
organized terror can perpetuate the ideals of 
sociological messianisms. For, if such a messianic 
ideal is able to succeed in motivating people to act 
and if these people do in fact derive some practical 
advantages from so doing, then the ideal will become 
superfluous and if, on the contrary, their actions 
based on the ideal prove to be useless in practical 
terms or even counterproductive, then, too, the ideal 
will become useless. Insofar as it survives, it will 
be only as a series of void slogans or as an 
imposition. No promise, the fulfillment of which 
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depends exclusively on the achievement of practical 
goals, can generate in the minds of people more than 
purely utilitarian calculations. The ideological 
distortion of sociological ideals consists therefore 
mainly in the attempt to dress up such ideals with the 
robe of transcendence and absolute necessity. 
From the perspective of the individual moral 
inquirer, on the other hand, sociological ideals appear 
as utterly abstract and void. They are too rigid to 
constitute the natural end of moral inquiry, although, 
of course, their achievement can bring about its 
factual termination. But a person who equates his 
practical well-being with the end of moral inquiry does 
not appear happy, only content. This impression is 
fully justified, since the real termination of moral 
inquiry can be only the absolute dissipation of moral 
doubt, that is, the achievement of a state in which it 
is both logically and psychologically impossible to 
continue the search for a total justification of 
action. A mere sense of contentment, which depends on 
external factors beyond the control of the individual 
moral agent, cannot be the response to a quest for the 
absolute justification of moral action. And this would 
be the case even if, like Faust sought to do, we were 
able to turn the instant of supreme contentment into an 
infinite state, for, as we have seen, what we are 
looking for is not only a psychological end to our 
inquiry, but, most importantly, a logical end to it. 
Paradise, even if it is to be earthly, must have some 
attributes capable of affording us a sense of 
fulfillment more powerful than the one that even the 
realization of the purest socialist ideals could 
provide us. The expectation of such a paradise, and it 
alone, can calm our moral uneasiness. 
But it neither physiological, psychological or 
sociological arguments can provide the ultimate answer 
to moral questions, and if we assume that these three 
types of explanations exhaust the gamut of possible 
naturalistic explanations, then we will either have to 
conclude that there is no final justification for human 
action, or that, if there is one, it cannot be 
naturalistic. Mere I will not concern myself with the 
first alternative, since, as I stated at the beginning, 
my task is not to prove the existence of God, but 
merely to determine the role of the concept of "God" in 
moral reasoning. Hence, it is to the second 
alternative that 1 must now address myself. 
The perceptive, but also the not-so-perceptive 
reader will have noticed that at the end of the 
previous argument we were left in a position similar to 
that in which Kant put himself before introducing his 
argument for the existence of Cod. But it is obvious 
that at this point we cannot simply follow Kant's 
steps, since we have already dismissed some of his 
basic claims as untenable. If, on the other hand, we 
show in different terms that the notion of "(Jod" is 
necessary to provide an ultimate jsutification for 
moral action, then the basic tenet of his thesis will 
have been proven, although, of course, not its details. 
What we need, then, is a justification for human 
action which is free of the effects of all the examined 
naturalistic proposals. It is important to notice from 
the outset, nevertheless, that whatever the nature of 
the ultimate fulfillment. of moral, action, such 
fulfillment cannot be totally independent from the 
concrete manifestations of. moral action, that is, moral 
action must, be both the matter and the aqent of ilp 
fulfillment. The negation of the efficacy of action in 
respect to its own fulfillment can be described as 
moral mysticism. Moral mysticism is self-defeating, 
since its very premises must lead it to proclaim the 
need to abstain from acting or, at the very least, the 
irrelevance or amorality oT action, for it is difficult 
to see why one ought, to act in order to achieve a good 
that, by assumption, and insofar as it is achievable, 
is so by means other than action. Certain forms of 
Protestantism seem to me to come very close to moral 
mysticism. 
Furthermore, the relation between that which needs 
to be justified or made meaningful, and that which 
gives meaning or justifies must be stich Mint the latter 
can be said to be the final cause of the former. It is 
immediately obvious that this relation implies the 
notion of an active link between its two terms. The 
concept of a passive relation amounts to the assertion 
that the mere simultaneous existence of the two beings 
confers meaning to the existence of one of them, which, 
in and by itself, would be meaningless. To give 
consistency to this concept; one has to assume a) that 
the existence of one of. these beings depends upon that 
of the other being and b) that their relationship is 
analogous to that between an artisan and his artifacts, 
since this is the only relationship capable of linking 
the existence of two beings so as to make the 
meaningfnlness of one compjetely dependent upon its 
meaning or utility for the other. All that is required 
to justify the existence of an artifact is its 
usefulness for its creator. On the other hand, it is 
impossible to see how the question of an ultimate 
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justification could arise in regard to beings, the mere 
existence of which renders them meaningful. This, as 
we have seen, is the intuitionist's way of begging the 
question. 
It is also evident that the relationship we are 
discussing cannot be blind or purely mechanical. If 
the "justifier" were to be conceived as a mere 
mechanism which is triggered or set to work when the. 
right things happen, then it would be not the idea of a 
final cause but, merely, that of an effect, 
furthermore, the notion of "justification" entails that 
of "evaluation." A thing cannot be justified unless 
its worth is proven; the justifier, therefore, must be 
thought of as endowed with the capacity to judge the 
worth of that which it is to justify. 
There are at least tv/o more attributes that the 
justifier must possess in .order to be able to perform 
its task appropriately, namely, it must be ubiquitous 
and eternal. That it must have these qualities follows 
from what has already been said concerning the relation 
between individual and collective action. For, as we 
saw, an ultimate justification of moral action requires 
both that each and every relevant action performed by 
each and every individual be justified, as well as 
their actions collectively considered. Given that 
actions are performed by individuals in different 
places, sometimes simultaneously and sometimes at 
different times, and given that the time span covered 
by these actions can, in principle, be extremely long, 
the justifier must be both ubiquious and eternal. 
Note, however, that the claim here is not that the time 
span occupied by the actions demanding to be justified 
is "infinite," but merely that it is or can be long. 
We have to assume that the process in need of 
justification is finite, since the justification of the 
actions of individual agents cannot be completed until 
the whole process, constituted by the sum total of 
their actions, has been judged. In other words, unless 
we want to fall back into the type of individualism we 
have ill ready rejected, we must assume that the act 
which provides the ultimate justification to both 
individual actions and the collective process they 
constitute is one and the same. 
There is, however, a stonger and more important 
indication that the justifier must be thought to be 
eternal. If it were finite, then the task of providing 
an ultimate justification would be beyond its powers. 
This is so, because if we think it to be the source of 
the justification it provides, such a justification 
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will last only as long as it itself lasts, and a 
perishable justificaton can hardly be called ultimate. 
In relation to this it is easy to appreciate the 
wisdom behind the Christian notion of the final 
judgment, which marks the end of the historical process 
and hence its fulfillment. We can also see the 
limitations of the notion: the final judgment is 
conceived as a collection of individual judgments and 
not as a single judgment passed on the historical 
process as a whole. The final justification must be of 
the latter rather than of the former sort, since part 
of its task must be the consolidation and reaffirmation 
of the substantial link between all individual actions. 
The question that arises rather naturally at this point 
is, of course, which individual actions are we talking 
about. While discussing psychologism we have 
demonstrated the absurdity of claiming that any action 
undertaken by an individual has the qualifications 
required to attract: the attention of the justifier. Let 
us, as I have surreptitiously done already, call those 
actions deserving of the attention of the justi fier 
"relevant" actions. We assume then that these actions, 
and these alone, contribute to the fulfillment of the 
historical process. It is obvious that our immediate 
task should be to examine them and to determine some 
sort of criterion for their identification. 
We can hardly imagine a more ridiculous claim than 
the one that each and every action undertaken by an 
individual is in need of justification. Most- of the 
things people do, do not call for a justification. 
Now, another large set of actions is fully and 
satisfactorily justified in terms of natural desires; 
and still another set of actions is justifiable in 
terms of moral obligations explainable on purely 
naturalistic grounds. These types of justifications 
and explanations of our actions are enough to satisfy 
our purely psychological demand for meaning fulness: a 
fact proven beyond any reasonable doubt by experience, 
since denying that this is indeed the case would be 
tantamount to asserting that people never act. In 
fact, most people do not only act, but they would feel 
that their life as a whole, that is, the sum total of 
their actions, were fully justified if it led to a 
state of contentment or happiness. Happiness, then, is 
the end of all psychological uneasiness. Now, if we 
assume with Aristotle, that the happiness of the 
individual is contingent upon that of the society as a 
whole (and this is undeniably a reasonable thing to say, 
since some of the actions of the happy persons are the 
fulfillment of moral obligations), then it becomes 
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clear that the mere notion of a happy society does not 
exhaust that of the final justification of human 
act ion. 
But if the actions that make a man a happy citizen 
of a happy society do not, by themselves, justify his 
existence absolutely, which actions are then left to 
perform this immense and elusive task? For a man 
cannot do more than he actually does, and the sum total 
of what he does are his actions as a citizen. There 
is only one way out of this riddle, it seems to me, and 
this is to assume that some of the actions of a man 
insofar as they lead toward happiness, perform at the 
same time another task, to wit, that of providing a 
final justification for his existence and that of the 
scenario of his actions, namely, the human community. 
However painful it may seem, however, the problem, 
at this point, is far from being solved. For not only 
are societies perishable and finite, but there are many 
of them, separated from each other not only by thick 
juridical walls, but also by even thicker and more 
impenetrable walls of hatred, enmity and secular 
mistrust. Are we to assume, then, a la Hegel, that 
only a few men in each period of time have the fortune 
of being born into a society in which their actions are 
capable of calling forth both happiness and the 
attention of a rather whimsical justifier? Are we to 
assume that there are "elected" people, as the 
repetitive legend of many a nation would have us 
believe? That this cannot be thought to be the case is 
clearly seen from our previous conclusions, which 
established that, regardless of what the ultimate 
justification of a man's life is, it must be in his 
power to attain it. And, obviously, this would not be 
the case unqualifiedly, were such power dependent on an 
accident of birth. Are we to think then, on the 
contrary, that the existence of each and any human 
society is justified? If by this we mean to say that 
the mere fact of existing absolutely justifies the 
existence of a society, we must be wrong, as has 
already been demonstrated in connection with the brief 
discussionsof intuitionism and sociologism. We must 
also be wrong if we believe that each society is 
separately justified, for it has been established 
before that the justification of the actions of all 
individuals must be one and the same. It follows, 
therefore, that, if the actions of all individuals as 
well as those of the societies they constitute are 
justifiable, all these actions and societies must be 
thought: of as being part of a single process: it must 
be postulated that they constitute one enity and that, 
hence, they are substantially linked to one another. 
Thus, the whole of human history must be imagined a.s a 
single process. 
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Now we begin to visualize a possible rr.iher.ion ho 
distinguish individual actions deprived or 
transcendental meaningfulness from those which possess 
stich meaningfulness. In general, we can say that those 
actions the exclusive purpose of which is the 
realization of the agent's (be it an individual or a 
society) goals are not transcendentally meaningful in 
an immediate and direct way, although it might be said 
that they are so in an indirect way, namely, insofar as 
they serve as a means for the realization of action of 
transcendental significance. It is their contribution 
to the fulfilment of the historical purpose of mankind 
which endows with ultimate meaningfulness the actions 
of individuals. But here, we ought to be very careful, 
and to begin with we ought to try to explicate in what 
sense the historical process can be said to be 
ultimately meaningful. Clearly, it is not so in 
itself, since being constituted of actions which are 
not seif-justified or intrinsically meaningful, a mere 
juxtaposition or collection of such actions cannot 
suddenly render them meaningful. The historical 
process must receive its final justification from 
outside, from a being capable of grasping it in all its 
details but also as a totality, and the idea of stich an 
ubiquitous, eternal, being, capable of rendering things 
meaningful is what has traditionally been called God. 
Many rather intriguing questions remain unanswered 
at this point, for instance, whether the historical 
process can fail to achieve its goal and hence, whether 
it can remain unjustified; whether some societies can 
fail to participate in the historical process, or, more 
precisely, in the part of it which renders it 
ultimately meaningful; whether the meaning of the 
historical process can be deciphered in advance by men 
and, thus, known "in concreto," as opposed to being 
known in general, namely,~as"existing. In regard to 
this last aspect, it is self-evident that the moral or 
practical efficiency of the notion of an ultimate 
justification of human action depends upon its being 
known by the human agents as an attainable possibility. 
But nothing more than the mete knowledge of the 
possibility of attaining an ultimate justification must 
be postulated as necessary from the point of view of 
practical efficiency, that is, one does not have to 
assume that humans know or can know in detail what; will 
ensue once history is fulfilled. This is perhaps why 
most gods have not taken the trouble to reveal, the 
secrets of life in paradise, save, perhaps, the ood of 
Islam. 
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The question whether some societies or some men can 
fail to tender their lives meaningful through their 
action is crucial to moral philosophy and to any kind 
of theology. Its discussion leads, among other things, 
to the study of the notion of freedom. Here I have to 
limit myself to a few very general remarks that, I 
hope, can at least insinuate the different issues to 
which one ought to pay attention in this connection. 
If one denies that individual human beings or 
societies can fail to render their action meaningful, 
one is immediately commited either to an intuitionist 
position of sorts, or, worst yet, to some kind of moral 
determinism. For, if the actions of societies and 
individuals can be justified regardless of what the 
actual content of these actions is, then it must be 
assumed that this is the case either because they are 
part of a predetermined finite series of causal 
connections, i.e. parts of a some sort of super-
masterplan, or that they are meaningful in themselves, 
and that, hence, their mere existence constitutes their 
justification. The latter alternative has already been 
sufficiently discussed. The first alternative demands 
some more attention. 
The type of determinism we are considering here 
could be called aprioristic determinism, in the sense 
that it implies the assumption that any relevant action 
undertaken by an individual or a society is endowed 
with a meaning even before it actually occurs. If an 
action is determined to happen, and if it is 
meaningful, then it must be assumed that its meaning 
does not depend upon its actually happening. The 
action therefore cannot be viewed as the source or 
cause of the meaning, but must be seen as the 
realization or materilization of it. For the 
determinist, actions do not bring about meaning, rather 
they simply objectivize it. But if this were indeed 
the case, then the historical process would be 
meaningtill even if it did not take place, for its 
actualization cannot add any meaning to its idea. If 
history is inevitably unfolding a predetermined master 
plan, then indeed nothing new can happen under the sun. 
It would seem, therefore, that we have to assume 
both that certain societies and individuals can fail to 
render their existences meaningful, and that the 
historical process as a whole can fail to achieve its 
final justification. This last proposition directly 
follows from the first, since it is quite conceivable 
that not only some, but all individuals and societies 
can fail to render their lives meaningful. 
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At this point, the perceptive tender will once more 
prevent us from putting an early end to these brief 
remarks, for he will submit a question which follows 
naturally from what has just been said- lie will say, 
"granting that God or whatever we call the juslifier 
does not predetermine the course of events, the 
question of whether he has a master plan for history, 
still, remains unsolved, since if he does not possess 
such a plan then it would seem that we have to conclude 
that the final meaning or justification of history is 
uncertain and depends entirely on his whim." 
Certainly, the idea of a whimsical, capricious 
justifier is not likely to inspire much confidence in 
people wondering about the meaning of. their lives. 
But, is the idea of an engineer-god, of a maker of 
blueprints and master plans the one that we ought lo 
oppose to that of a whimsical-god? The tradition, 
quite reasonably it would seem, has, more often than 
not, taken a different course: to the idea of a 
whimsical-god it has opposed that of a just-god. The 
justifier, as we have seen, must be conceived as a 
judge; but if he is to be an efficient justifier, he 
must also be conceived as a just and, hence, completely 
reliable judge. The ultimate justification of human 
action, therefore. is also a supreme act of justice. 
It must be thought of as the recognition of. the special 
merit of certain particular actions or accomplishments. 
God, tinlike the Greek historian or the Spanish 
chronicler, must not simply think that certain events 
are curious or fantastic enough to be recorded and 
preserved in the memory, he must honor them and praise 
their worth as an act of justice. 
Now, 1 think, we are jn a better position to 
characterize, if not fully, at least more precisely 
what we have colled "relevant acts." Relevant acts 
cannot be those aimed exclusively at the perpetuation 
of a man's life, or even at the preservation of his 
society, since these actions, as we have repeatedly 
seen, can be fully explained and justified on purely 
naturalistic grounds. The actions of a person or 
societies are relevant in relation to their ultimate 
justification not insofar as they are exclusively 
directed towards the presetvation of their existences, 
but only insofar as they are aimed at realizing a 
certain type of existence. This type of existence must 
be the result of unusual efforts, of undertakings that 
go beyond the demands of everyday social life, provided 
that such undertakings seek to achieve universal and 
not merely particular or local goals. In other words, 
the actions of individuals and societies can be part of 
the great search for meaningfulness and deserve the 
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recognition of the justifier only if they can, actually 
or potentially, affect humanity as a whole. Again the 
wisdom of those religions which possess a universal ist 
thrust becomes evident, for if salvation is not open to 
all, it is open to none. 
A rather curious conclusion can be drawn from what 
precedes, namely that even if history as a whole fails 
to become meaningful, and even if in the course of 
human existence only one relevant act were to be 
performed, this one act would be meaningful to some 
extent and deserve the recognition of God in the final 
judgment, for it would mark the extent of the 
meaningfulness of human history. The failure of the 
total process does not completely invalidate the 
success of its parts, since God can individualize his 
judgment. On the other hand, if the end of history is 
not the recognition of its worth by God, but merely the 
achievement of a certain state of affairs, socialism 
say, and this is not accomplished, the final failure 
renders each and every individual action directed 
towards this goal meaningless. This, of course, 
depends on the assumption that such goals can indeed 
provide an ultimate justification of human existence, 
which is an idea we have already rejected. 
Kven these brief introductory remarks on the 
relationship between the concept of God and morality 
cannot be concluded without some reference to the most 
thorny issue that anyone engaged in these sorts of 
inquiries must face, namely, the question as to exactly 
how God is the source of absolute moral obligation. In 
our criticism of Kant we pointed out his inability to 
account for this as a major fault in his moral theory--
an inability of which, in Martin Buber's opinion, Kant 
himself was aware and desperately tried to remedy in 
his later years. What Buber says of Kant can, 
unit at i s mutandis, be said of our view as developed so 
far. We too have yet to show that our knowledge that 
doing certain things would give transcendental meaning 
both to our actions and to the history of mankind 
itself, should produce a sense of absolute obligation. 
Nov/, it is clear that if the obligation we are 
talking about is absolute, it cannot have anything to 
do with fear- of reprisal or anything like that, since 
if this were the case it would not be unconditional 
and, hence, absolute. So, the idea of divine 
punishment as,the source of absolute obligation must be 
discarded, as must, for the same reasons, the idea of 
heavenly rewards. In fact, I would go so far as to say 
that God's feelings, if he experiences any, must be 
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completely disregarded. Nothing done to please Dim or 
to offend Him belongs to the realm of obligation. onJy 
two of God's attributes, therefore, can be taken into 
account in this context , and these are His potency and 
His justice, i. e., his ability to justify our actions. 
It would seem, then, that the mere thought of the 
possibility of the final justification of action should 
somehow generate a feeling of absolute obligation in 
individuals. How this might happen, we now have to try 
to imagine. But first let us make sure that we 
understand what is meant by the expression "absolute 
obligation." 
We saw at the beginning that obligations 
simpliciter are accounted for, without exception, in 
terms of the needs to be fulfilled to make possible the 
establishment of a human community. An absolute 
obligation, on the other hand, must be unconditional, 
and, hence, in some sense it must not depend upon any 
desire other than that of fulfilling the obligation. 
Or, to put it differently, the fulfillment of an 
absolute obligation must be conceived as an end in 
itself. 
But this conclusion rather than clarifying things 
seems to complicate them enormously, for, in a sense, 
it amounts to a negation of the basic thesis of this 
paper, that God is indispensable for the final 
justification of action. Let me explain. If indeed 
the fulfillment of an absolute obligation is an end in 
itself, then presumably even an atheist can recognize 
its worth, provided that, in the manner of the 
intuitionists, he acknowledges the existence of self-
contained absolute values. We must show, therefore, 
that the notion of. God is analytically inherent in the 
thought of a final justification of action. This 
amounts to showing that the atheist is an insipi ens in 
the Anselm!an sense, that he does not know what he is 
talking about. This proof is a necessary positive 
complement to the negative proofs developed earlier in 
the paper. 
I inquire into my potentials and obligations and, 
with ease, come to understand my duties toward my 
fellow men. But then I ask myself about the ultimate 
sense of all my action and whether I have an obligation 
to go beyond the most immediate requirements of social 
life. The first thing I must notice is that such an 
obligation cannot be expressed in terms of commands, 
since commands can never express absolute obligations. 
No action which is inherently good, good without 
qualifications, need be the object of a command, since 
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it is unthinkable that a being sensitive enough to 
recognize goodness could refuse to materialize it. A 
being which refuses to help materialize unqualified 
goodness must be either utterly insensitive and 
thoroughly evil, or totally ignorant. If the latter, 
then he could not be able to identify goodness at all, 
for whoever does not know anything, cannot know 
goodness; if the former is the case, either the being 
cannot recognize goodness, or, if he can, he cannot 
possibly help materialize it, in spite of all the 
commands to that effect, since evil cannot be a direc£ 
and free agent of the materialization of goodness. 
If there is a God, it is not, therefore, because they 
stem from his commands that we have to fulfill absolute 
obligations. 
How, then, does the thought of the Divinity enter 
our vi talistic calculations? It does not move us by 
generating fear, nor does it stir us to action by 
invoking the idea of inescapable commands. What it 
does, it seems to me, is allow us to represent to 
ourselves the very possibility of realizing the 
potential for relevant action with which we are endowed 
as soon as we become aware of such potential. 
Consequently, the very thought of an ultimate purpose 
of action is identical with the notion of God. 
Essentially, this notion is the idea of possibility of 
constructing meaningfulness. The atheist is indeed an 
insiniens; moreover, he displays infinite imprudentia 
in aiming his efforts towards a goal without asking 
himself about the possibility of fulfillment. The 
atheist is one who steps into the abyss. 
Now we can, 1 think, properly account for the 
concept of absolute obligation. Once a person becomes 
aware of the possibility of endowing his existence and 
the existence of his species with meaning, he will also 
realize that the failure to do so is an infinite, 
irreparable, dismal Loss. It is the fright, the 
overwhelming sensation of waste that the realization of 
the dangers of moral laziness generate, which 
constitutes the substance of absolute obligation. Two, 
then, are the constitutive feelings of the sensation of 
absoluteness. One is the certitude of death, the 
awareness of the finitude of human existence; the 
second is the realization of the possibilities which 
can be wasted by inaction. But these feelings in 
themselves could generate only despair were they not 
accompanied by the idea of God, which offers a 
guarantee of fulfillment. 
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The atheist, on the other hand, cannot experience 
the sensation of absoluteness, since in denyinn the 
existence of God, lie minimizes the gravity of the 
failure. Failure can appear to him only as 
regrettable, not: as hideous. • 
Clearly, the most important question which remains 
unanswered is the one concerning the existence of God. 
As Kant has taught us so well, from the mere fact that 
we wish that our efforts have an ultimate purpose it 
does not follow that they do in fact have such a 
purpose. But this crucial philosophical question need 
not bother us now, since the intention of this rather 
hasty collection of notes is simply to exhibit how a 
person interested in arguing for an ultimate meaning of 
human action would have to proceed. But even this very 
general, examination of the issues shows, I hope, that 
any attempt to offer an absolute justification of human 
action must rely on the notion of God. In this sense 
this notion is inescapable, for the only alternative to 
it is the belief that human existence is ultimately 
worthless. 
University of Kentucky 
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use here the adjectives "free" and "direct" 
because I do not wish to claim that a being or an evil 
force like MephiStopheles is unthinkable. Evil might 
well be a tool of goodness, but it must be so in spite 
of itself. This is not a mere verbal game. Goodness 
and Evil are conceived here as opposite aims or goals 
of rational, purposeful human action, and hence, they 
are mutually exclusive. 
